Online debates have been brewing over the controversial Ngwe Saung discussion, held at Ngwe Saung Beach on 28 September 2024. The meeting, which brought together 39 politicians, activists, and former political prisoners, included notable figures such as Ko Mya Aye, a prominent 1988 student leader; Sai Nyunt Lwin, a leader of the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy; and Sai Ye Kyaw Swa Myint, the executive director of election watchdog PACE. Representatives from the People’s Representatives Committee for Federalism (PRCF)—an alliance of political parties formed after the coup to resolve the conflict through political means—were also in attendance. The PRCF had previously established its federal democracy charter in February 2024.
The discussion aimed to explore potential solutions to Myanmar's ongoing conflicts through dialogue. It resulted in a set of seven proposed points, which includes establishing a federal democratic union, holding political dialogue within a defined timeframe, with international support, setting pre-conditions for dialogue, such as the release of political prisoners, including civilian leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and an immediate nationwide cessation of fighting, forming an administrative mechanism for the transition period, and cooperating with the international community in rehabilitation and reconstruction. The talking points were later presented at the Myanmar Affairs Talks (Jakarta Talks) held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on 4-5 October 2024, which the junta and NUG representatives also attended.
The Ngwe Saung discussion, however, faced significant criticism online, particularly from resistance communities both in Myanmar and the diaspora. Critics raised concerns about the proposed precondition for an immediate halt to fighting, arguing that it could undermine recent advances made by resistance forces. Others criticized the reliance on international organizations, pointing to past failures of similar peace initiatives. At the same time, some argued that efforts to find a resolution to the conflict, even if imperfect, should not be dismissed outright.
The backlash was further fueled by misleading media headlines labeling the proposals as an "agreement." Ko Mya Aye clarified in a media interview that the discussion’s purpose was merely to offer suggestions for a way forward, not to establish binding agreements. He also emphasized that any dialogue must occur outside the framework of the 2008 Constitution.
In the meantime, the controversy has sparked broader discussions about the feasibility of meaningful dialogue between the junta and pro-democracy opposition forces. While many point to the lack of necessary preconditions for dialogue, others highlight deeper ideological divisions between proponents of political solutions and advocates of armed resistance with “growing confidence” over their recent achievements, particularly with the capture of over 90 towns. However, the issue runs deeper than ideological divides or resistance gains, which, as outlined below, can be somewhat misleading.
One significant factor, often overlooked, is the insufficient leverage held by the National Unity Government (NUG) or mainland resistance forces to compel the junta to engage in dialogue. For any meaningful dialogue to take place, the willingness or consensus among resistance actors and political parties alone is not enough. The Bamar-led resistance groups under NUG leadership need to first establish stronger leverage over the regime. Currently, out of 95 towns claimed by “revolutionary groups”, a whopping 87 were captured by ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), many of which maintain minimal or no alliances with the NUG and have already made their own initiatives, proposing negotiations with the regime. This brings us to another recurring issue of miscategorization, where observers and resistance actors often conflate NUG-led resistance groups with EAOs whose political agendas do not necessarily align with mainland resistance. This conflation, albeit unintentionally, obscures the condition that when by itself, the NUG-led resistance might not yet be able to pressure the junta into dialogue.
