China-Facilitated Ceasefire Reached Between Myanmar junta and the MNDAA

On January 20, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that a ceasefire agreement had been reached between the junta and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Negotiations, which had been stalled for months, concluded in mid-January, effectively halting fighting between the two factions on January 18, according to the foreign ministry. 

Conflicting reports have emerged regarding the terms of the agreement. Exile media outlet Myanmar Now reported that, as part of the agreement, the Kokang EAO (MNDAA) agreed to withdraw its troops from Lashio by June, potentially greenlighting the regime to retake control of the Northeastern Regional Command headquarters. The command had fallen in August 2024 and was subsequently relocated to Tangyan, approximately 50 miles southeast of Lashio. On the other hand, BBC media reported that the administration of the town will be split between MNDAA and the regime, following a model similar to National Democratic Alliance Army’s Shan State Special Region-4 area, citing internal Chinese sources. Meanwhile, an MNDAA member confirmed the ceasefire agreement to Khit Thit Media but denied claims of MNDAA’s withdrawal from Lashio. 

For now, Chinese authorities have reopened the border crossing in Chin Shwe Haw, a town in the MNDAA-controlled Kokang region of northern Shan State. Before its closure, the Chin Shwe Haw border trade post facilitated border trade valued at up to USD 1 million per day on average, according to the Institute for Strategy and Policy - Myanmar. The UWSA also announced the reopening of the Namtit Bridge border checkpoint with China's permission. This ceasefire agreement followed significant pressure from China on the Kokang EAO, including the detention of its leader, Peng Daxun, and a blockade on border trade in Kokang and Wa-controlled areas. It remains unclear what concessions, if any, were granted to the MNDAA and what arrangements would be made to its control of the entire Kokang region following Operation 1027. 

With the MNDAA yielding to these pressures, attention now turns to another 3BHA member, the TNLA, which has already indicated its willingness to engage in dialogue with the junta under similar pressure from China. Regardless of the ceasefire possibility, without MNDAA backing, the TNLA is unlikely to resume fighting for the time being. This development gives the regime a breather in northern Shan State, allowing it to redirect manpower and resources toward other conflict zones, particularly Rakhine and Chin states where it is facing unprecedented losses, as well as the Central Dry Zone.